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ACCESS FOR THE FUTURE: IMPROVING MAINE’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE THROUGH MUNICIPAL CONTROLS TO
ENSURE COASTAL ACCESS FOR CONTINUING
BENEFIT TO MAINE’S PEOPLE AND ECONOMY
Allison Kuhns1
Abstract
The public trust doctrine generally guarantees the public access to
the shoreline, which is held in trust for the public by the state. In
Maine, a pre-Revolutionary War ordinance limits the public trust
doctrine by granting private landowners rights to the same shoreline
areas. Access to the shoreline area is subject to frequent legal battles
and court decisions have not cured the conflict between the public's
rights and the private landowners' rights. Maine's economy relies
heavily on public access to the shoreline. This comment suggests
that the public's rights should be protected. First, the public trust
doctrine does not violate any part of the Maine State Constitution.
Second, the ordinance that grants private landowners rights does not
erase the public's rights. Third, public access to the shoreline can be
established through land use controls. Land use controls will enable
public access without removing the rights of private landowners.

1

J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2020.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this country, private real property ownership occupies a
sacred place in the legal canon. Beyond the principle of eminent
domain, which is heavily restricted through various takings
doctrines,2 few mechanisms can interfere with a private property
owner’s rights to the exclusive use and enjoyment of their land. 3
History, however, established an exception to these sacred property
rights that is the subject of frequent legal and legislative debate: the
public trust doctrine. At its most basic meaning, the public trust
doctrine is a legal principle enshrining the public’s right to use of
navigable waters, delegating protection of this right to the individual
states.4 The application of this doctrine, however, is anything but
basic. There are as many definitions and implementation methods
of this doctrine as there are jurisdictions subject to it.5 Each state
must determine what the public trust doctrine will look like within
its jurisdiction, based generally around defining the following:
(1) [T]he waters subject to state/public ownership;
(2) the line or lines dividing private from public title
in those waters; (3) the waters subject to public use
rights; (4) the line or lines in those waters that mark
the limit of public use rights; and (5) the public uses
that the doctrine will protect in the waters where the
public has use rights.6
With these elements defined, states must take on the task of
defending them in the interest of the public. However, states are
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause of this Amendment states “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Id.
(This Clause forms the backbone of takings doctrines barring commandeering of
private property for use by the public and applies to the states as well as the
federal government).
3
Peter H. Kenlan, Maine’s Open Lands: Public Use of Private Land, The Right
to Roam, and The Right to Exclude, 68ME. L. REV.. 185, 187-88 (2016).
4
Public-trust doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
5
See Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16
PENN. ST. ENVT’L. L. REV.. 1 (2007).
6
Id. at 3.
2
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often hindered in attempts to implement straightforward
applications of the doctrine, despite the long historical traditions
supporting it. The public’s rights to shoreland areas in particular
face consistent obstacles. Relying on the Takings Clause and
societal interests in preserving private property rights, private
landowners regularly bring challenges in courtrooms, municipal
settings, and before state governments when they fall subject to the
doctrine as their state defines it.7 These legal challenges illustrate
the inherent tension between the culturally iconic value of private
property ownership and the history- and policy-driven public trust
doctrine. This history of litigation and occasional uproar has
dramatically influenced the way the public trust doctrine is defined
and enforced around the country.8 Myriad articles and comments
have been written suggesting solutions to these conflicts, but no
clear answer has arisen as of yet.
Without any clear answer on the nature of the public trust
doctrine in Maine, the public’s rights remain vague. Because of
certain court decisions, the public currently have limited access to
Maine’s coastal shoreland areas, where private persons own the
upland lots, based entirely on the willingness of the landowners to
allow the public access to the shoreline and public access to the
shoreline is decided entirely by those private, upland owners.9 Many
argue that this violates the rights protected by the public trust

See Colin H. Roberts, It’s All Mine, Stay Off, and Let Me Do What I Please:
An Abyss Between the Rights and Desires of Coastal Property Owners and
Public Privileges and Protections?, 18 J OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 255 (2013);
Haochen Sun, Toward a New Social-Political Theory of the Public Trust
Doctrine, VT. L. REV. 563 (2011).
8
“The nature and extent of the public’s interest in the intertidal zone has been a
subject of much debate, litigation, and judicial writing.” Ross v. Acadian
Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 13, 206 A.3d 283.
9
See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); ORLANDO DELOGU,
MAINE’S BEACHES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY: THE BELL CASES MUST BE
REEXAMINED (2017) (presenting the controversial opinion that a series of cases
in the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in the 1980s, culminating in Bell v Town of
Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989), were incorrectly decided and must be
overturned. These cases will be discussed in this comment); MARINE LAW
INST., UNIV. OF ME. SCH. OF LAW, PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS AND THE MOODY
BEACH CASE (1990).
7
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doctrine.10 In order to suggest a solution to this conflict between the
rights of the public and the private landowners, this comment will
explore the public trust doctrine in coastal Maine through its history,
controversies, and current applications. It will not cover the public
trust doctrine as it applies to inland waterways, although tensions
exist in those contexts, as well.
To best address the concerns around the public trust doctrine
in Maine, the State should pass legislation authorizing towns to
enact or enforce land use and land control programs that give private
landowners certain ownership rights to intertidal11 lands while still
allowing the State to hold those lands in trust for the people of
Maine. By doing this, the State of Maine can honor the rights and
interests of the private landowners while allowing the public to
exercise their rights to use the land covered under the doctrine. First,
this comment will summarize the history and background of the
public trust doctrine in Maine and how a unique pre-Revolutionary
War colonial ordinance has affected it. Next, it will discuss the ways
in which Maine’s current implementation of the public trust doctrine
does not properly adhere to the doctrine’s meanings and goals. It
will then analyze three aspects related to Maine’s application of the
doctrine: 1) whether it aligns with the Maine State Constitution; 2)
how to reconcile the doctrine with the Massachusetts Colonial
Ordinance of 1641-1647; and 3) whether the use of local land use
controls can improve public access to the shoreline under the
doctrine. Finally, this comment will briefly map out a strategy for
the State to use in amending the implementation of the public trust
doctrine to better protect the public’s rights while honoring the
rights of littoral landowners.12
10

See DELOGU, supra note 8. See also Ross, 2019 ME 45, 206__ A.3d 283__
(Saufley, C.J., concurring); McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 62
(Levy, J, concurring).
11
“[D]escribed as the area from the mean high-water mark to the mean lowwater mark but not more than 100 rods” Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 10, 206__ A.3d
283__ (majority opinion).
12
Littoral: “Of, relating to, or involving the coast or shore of an ocean, sea, or
lake.” Littoral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In this comment, the
phrase littoral landowners refers to the private property owners of the land
directly adjacent to the coastal waters. Littoral owners are often referred to as
“upland owners” in documents discussing the public trust doctrine.
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II. BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MAINE
When discussing the public trust doctrine in Maine, the preand post-Revolutionary War history of the state provides an
important legal foundation for the development and application of
this doctrine.13 The area currently comprising the State of Maine
was originally under the jurisdiction of the Colony of
Massachusetts, making it subject to the laws of Massachusetts until
Maine obtained statehood in 1820.14 Before Maine became a
separate state, Massachusetts enacted an ordinance, the
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647, that granted
private shoreland landowners title in fee simple absolute15—that is,
full ownership rights, including the right to exclude others from the
shoreland down to the low water mark.16 The Ordinance required
landowners to avoid interfering with the public’s navigation,
fishing, and fowling, although the public was not allowed to
interfere with the owner’s right to build wharves on this land.17
At the time, this grant of title ran counter to the English
common law that formed the background of much of the legal

13

Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 9, 206 A.3d 283.
Craig, supra note 4, at 61.
15
“An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law,
endures until the current holder dies without heirs” Fee simple, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “An estate of indefinite or potentially infinite
duration . . . Often shortened to fee simple or fee.” Fee simple absolute, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16
Craig, supra note 4, at 66 (referencing the goal of encouraging private
landowners to build wharves on the intertidal land in an effort to grow
commerce outside of the Crown’s control). See also Conservation Law Found.
v. Dept. of Envt’l Protection, 2003 ME 62, ¶ 36, 823 A.2d 551, 563 (confirming
that private landowners have the right to “wharf out,”, subject to “reasonable
regulation,”, and that the public is not allowed to interfere with this right, despite
the right to fishing, fowling, and navigation). The low water mark or mean low
water mark is “the annual average of the height on the shore reached by the
water at its lowest ebb each day.” Low Water Mark (Mean Low Water Mark or
MLW), THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION
(2012).
17
Craig, supra note 4, at 66.
14
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framework of the colonies and the United States.18 English common
law had delineated the ownership of this land to the crown, “subject
to the public’s rights of ‘navigation,’ ‘commerce,’ and ‘fishing,’”
while the Ordinance granted that ownership to private persons.19
Because Maine was under the jurisdiction of the Colony of
Massachusetts at the time this unique Colonial Ordinance was
enacted and therefore subject to it, the development of the public
trust doctrine and concepts of public access and use rights to
shoreland areas has not paralleled that of the rest of the United States
and even the rest of the world.20 Unfortunately, the result is “one of
the most restrictive public trust doctrines in the country.”21
Although Maine’s public trust doctrine is restrictive, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has upheld
at least in words the basic principles of the public trust doctrine
based on the Maine Constitution.22 When asked to review the
constitutionality of a bill permitting the State to release the State’s
ownership interests in areas of intertidal land filled by private
landowners, the court determined that this fell within the State’s role
as trustees of the public interest under Maine Constitution Article
IV, pt. 3, § 1 (the “Legislative Powers Clause”).23 However, the
Maine courts have stopped short of clearly identifying the
constitutional foundation for the public trust doctrine.24 Fortunately,
the courts have repeatedly expressed adherence to the goals and
policies of the public trust doctrine.25 The Law Court also has taken
occasion in its opinions to recognize the importance of the public
trust doctrine, including the rights to fishing, fowling, and
navigation, while acknowledging changing circumstances that

18

Id.
Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 10, 206 A.3d 283.
20
Kenlan, supra note 2, at 203.
21
Id.
22
Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981).
23
Id.
24
Harding v. Comm’r of Marine Res., 510 A.2d 533, 537 (1986) (refusing to
identify any specific basis for the public trust doctrine in Maine’s State
Constitution).
25
See, e.g., Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d at 606.
19
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might influence its interpretation and application.26 The Court has
specifically suggested that public interests in submerged lands might
be expanded as society grows.27 Thus, the courts have indicated that
the Maine State Constitution contains some consideration for the
public trust doctrine and that the rights it protects are adaptable,
despite the restrictiveness imposed on it by the Massachusetts
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647.
While the constitutional connection has not yet been made
explicit, Maine has several statutes that elaborate on the potential
constitutional consideration. Although a legislative act specifically
codifying the public’s rights to fishing, fowling, navigation, and
recreation in the intertidal zone was declared an unconstitutional
taking by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,28 several other statutes
clearly designate that certain intertidal and submerged lands are held
by the State in trust for the public.29 The specific language of these
statutes varies, but each supports the conclusion that the State of

26

Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 36 n.12, 206 A.3d 283
(listing activities deemed permissible by the courts under an expansive view of
fishing, fowling, and navigation); McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28
A.3d 620, ¶ 37, 39 (majority opinion) (suggesting that fishing, fowling, and
navigation should be “broad[ly] underst[ood and] adapted to reflect the realities
of use in each era”); Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d at 607.
27
Harding, 510 A.2d at 537.
28
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173-76 (Me. 1989).
29
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1846 (2018) (codifying the State’s holding
of public reserved lands in trust for the public); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §
1862(3) (2018) (allowing the State to lease and grant easements over intertidal
and submerged lands unless the lease or easement “will unreasonably interfere
with customary or traditional public access ways to or public trust rights in, on,
or over the intertidal or submerged lands and the waters above those lands”);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1865 (2018) (reaffirming that the State holds
submerged lands in the public trust while neglecting to make a definitive
statement regarding intertidal lands, although different approaches to statutory
interpretation could find this either indicative of or contradictory to the State’s
interest in the intertidal land for the benefit of the public); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 6855 (2018) (“The Legislature, recognizing that the submerged and
intertidal lands . . . are owned by the State for the benefit of the public and are
impressed with a public trust . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 435 (2018)
(declaring zoning and land use controls of shoreland areas to be in the public
interest and to fall under the State’s role as trustee of this land for the public).

310

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:2

Maine holds some authority over the use and disposition of intertidal
lands in its role as trustee for the people.
III. MAINE’S CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROPERLY
ADHERE TO THE DOCTRINE’S MEANING AND
GOALS
While it would be inaccurate to call the public trust doctrine
a universal principle with the same meaning and goals in every
jurisdiction,30 the general current of thought in Maine’s legal
community clarifies a few of the basic ideals embodied in the
doctrine in this state.
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine is Meant to Ensure Access to
the Intertidal Zones by the General Public and Not Just
Private Littoral Owners

Although the history of the public trust doctrine in Maine is
inextricably wrapped up in the Colonial Ordinance from
Massachusetts and competing common and statutory law
provisions, court decisions and commentators return time and again
to the policy goals embodied in the public trust doctrine. These legal
sources affirm that private littoral landowners have title in fee
simple absolute to the low water mark in tidal areas, but they
routinely assert that this title does not exempt these landowners from
providing the public access to the shoreland.31 Although the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court has declined to make a precedential ruling
on the nature of these competing interests in the same property,32 a
30

See Craig, supra note 4.
“[T]he public trust doctrine means, for the owner of coastal property, that the
owner's property rights in the intertidal zone are subject to the public's rights to
fishing, fowling, and navigation. However, the public's rights in these activities
have always been subject to the owner's ’right to wharf out to the navigable
portion of the body of water.’" Conservation Law Found. v. Dept. of Envtl.
Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 36, 823 A.2d 551, 563 (quoting Great Cove Boat Club v.
Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 95 (Me. 1996)).
32
“Our jurisprudence has not clearly established, for all purposes, the
delineation between the public and private rights in and to the intertidal area.”
31
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solution to these issues need not come from a landmark court
decision, an amendment to the State Constitution, nor sweeping
legislative action.
Examining the interactions between the
principles at the foundation of the legal tangle that exists today
shows that a solution requires no drastic action.
When looked at from a critical historical perspective, the
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 does not establish an
impenetrable right to exclude for all littoral landowners.33 Instead,
the Ordinance specifies that the reason the landowners were granted
title to the land down to the low water mark was to encourage
“wharfing out” in an attempt to circumvent the trade monopoly held
by the British on goods shipped by sea.34 Unfortunately, in trying to
take power from the British Crown in favor of the Massachusetts
residents, the Ordinance disrupted the ancient principles of the
public trust doctrine.35

Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 13, 206 A.3d 283; see also
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620; Almeder v. Town of
Kennebunkport, 2019 ME 151, 217 A.3d 1111 (determining that the Town holds
title to the disputed beach by tracing ownership to colonial era land grants,
wherefore the private property owners have no right to exclude the public).
33
The right to exclude is one of the basic rights of property ownership and is
particularly fiercely guarded in Maine. Kenlan, supra note 2, at 187.
34
The Colony of Massachusetts enacted the Ordinance with myriad purposes
behind it, but the grant of title to the shoreland property owners was motivated
first by a desire to ensure that the residents of coastal communities could access
the water for food and resources and secondly for the purpose of privatizing
trade. Under British Colonial rule, all the wharves and shipping stations were
controlled by the Crown, keeping the Colonies entirely dependent on British
magnanimity to maintain reliable trade with the rest of the world. When the
Ordinance took effect, the private property owners were encouraged to “wharf
out” on their land, that is, build wharves that trading vessels could dock at and
avoid the Crown’s controls. The property owners were able to build wharves
only after they were granted title to the intertidal zone because the Crown had
previously controlled all building in the area between the high-water mark and
the low-water mark. Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells be
Eroded with Time? 57ME. L. REV.. 117, 123-25 (2005).
35
“By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind--the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one,
therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects
habitations, monuments, and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject
only to the law of nations.” JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTIONS II.1.1 (Thomas Collett
Sandars trans., 7th Am. ed. 1876).
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Despite this, the Ordinance made clear that the grant of title
was for trade purposes and was not meant to interfere with public
rights, as long as the public uses did not interfere with trade.36 Thus,
an historically faithful adherence to the Massachusetts Colonial
Ordinance does not require blind deference to the whims of the
private landowners. If the Ordinance is viewed as, it was intended—
preventing state-control of all trade by opening up shipping to
private persons—then there need not be any conflict with the public
trust doctrine. A landowner can successfully build wharves and
receive trade on their coastal property while the public enjoys access
to the land for fishing, fowling, navigation, and even recreation.
Rather than follow the line of certain controversial Law Court cases
and leave the public entirely at the mercy of landowners for gaining
access to the intertidal zone for any purpose,37 Maine can find a via
media honoring the intent of both the Ordinance of 1647 and the
much older public trust doctrine.
B.

Ensuring Public Shoreline Access is Essential to the
Character and Future of Maine

The coastline in Maine is vast but little of it is open for public
access. The general public traditionally should have the right to
engage in fishing, fowling, and navigation in the intertidal zone.39
These three activities intimately relate to the centrality of the
coastline in Maine’s culture. Much of Maine’s economy depends
on access to the coastline, particularly in traditional occupations
such as fishing.40 While the recent debate about the continuing
38

35

Thaxter, supra note 33, at 123-24.
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 192 (Me. 1989) (Wathen, J.,
dissenting).
38
Elizabeth Sheehan & Hugh Cowperthwaite, Preserving Commercial Fishing
Access: A Study of Working Waterfronts in 25 Maine Communities 4 (Coastal
Enterprises, Inc., 2002),
https://www1.maine.gov/dmr/mcp/downloads/workingwaterfront/preservingcom
mercialfishing.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ47-KMZR].
39
Kenlan, supra note 2, at 197.
40
“Our commercial fishing industry makes a valuable and important
contribution – as a producer of high quality protein to feed our families, as a
generator of over 26,000 jobs, and as a creator of real income for Maine’s rural
communities. In 2001, the industry’s economic impact climbed to over $860
37
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relevance of the limits placed on access by certain court decisions
has honed in on recreation, the coast continues to provide a
livelihood for many Maine residents.41 Even though expansion of
public shoreline access should include recreational purposes, the
current implementation of the public trust doctrine falls short of
guaranteeing access for the three basic uses and this threatens
Maine’s residents who depend on the shore for their income.
Among fishing, fowling, and navigation, fishing by far occupies the
most significant position in the interests of Maine’s residents and
economic interests.
1.

Fishing

Defined under Maine statute as “to take or attempt to take
any marine organism by any method or means,”42 fishing comprises
a major segment of Maine’s economy.43 With only 25% of
commercial fishing access provided by public facilities, access to
the other 75% via private avenues necessarily falls under the public
trust doctrine.44 However, trends in coastal property ownership put
this private access at risk.45 More and more, private landowners are
restricting access to the shoreline for commercial fishing.46 Even
traditionally, public access points are being converted to private use
as land prices and interest in private ownership increases.47 Because
commercial fishing contributes so significantly to the Maine

million from $773 million the year before.” Sheehan &Cowperthwaite, supra
note 37, at 4.
41
Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 53, 760 A.2d 232, 249 (Saufley, J.,
concurring); see John Duff, Public Shoreline Access in Maine: A Citizen’s
Guide to Ocean and Coastal Law 6-7 (Maine Sea Grant College Program,
2016), https://www.maine.gov/dacf/parks/docs/public-shoreline-access-inmaine.pdf, [https://perma.cc/8SGR-JUMU].
42
“Fish, the verb. The verb ‘fish’ means to take or attempt to take any marine
organism by any method or means.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6001(17)
(2018).
43
See Sheehan &Cowperthwaite, supra note 37.
43
Id. at 5.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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economy, steps must be taken to ensure continued public access to
the shoreline to prevent further damage to this industry.48
A further concern about fishing increases the need for
expediency in clarifying and guaranteeing public access rights.
Recent developments in demand for sea products beyond fish have
sparked debate about what exactly qualifies as fishing for the
purposes of the public trust doctrine. Seaweed harvesting forms the
center of these debates. The Maine statute defining fishing refers
only to “tak[ing] or attempt[ing] to take any marine organism by
any method or means,”49 but the Law Court recently determined that
harvesting rockweed, a type of seaweed that anchors in the top
millimeters of the sea floor in the intertidal zone, does not fall under
this definition.50 Although the concurrence allowed that taking
seaweed “was not within the reasonable access contemplated” under
the public trust doctrine, it also noted that Rhode Island amended its
state constitution to include seaweed harvesting in the public’s
rights.51 While the status of seaweed harvesting has been settled by
the courts, any future confusion can be avoided by establishing clear
rights and boundaries under the public trust doctrine in Maine and
creating avenues for the public and landowners to settle access
debates without resorting to lengthy and costly legal action.
2.

Fowling and Navigation

The other two traditionally protected activities under the
public trust doctrine, fowling and navigation, have not been the
subject of nearly as much legal debate. Fowling is the narrower of
the two in scope, covering only bird hunting.52 Navigation has seen
occasional legal contests, but is generally understood in the
traditional sense to mean boating on the water covering the intertidal
lands, mooring on the submerged land, and pulling craft up on the
48

Id. (identifying six main threats to the commercial fishing industry in Maine
communities related to continued reduction of public access to the shoreline).
49
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6001(17) (2018) (emphasis added).
50
Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, 206A.3d 283 Duff, supra note
40, at 6-7.
51
Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 43 & n.14, 206 A.3d 283(Saufley, C.J., concurring).
52
Duff, supra note 40, at 7.
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intertidal land when the tide is out.53 These activities can be personal
or commercial and can include taking on and discharging passengers
and cargo.54
Interestingly, the Law Court held in 2011 that crossing the
intertidal zone for commercial scuba diving fell under the
“navigation” umbrella, although the concurrence urged that this
activity strays into recreation and that the public trust doctrine needs
to essentially be modernized to include recreation as a fourth
permitted activity.55 The concurrence in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants
went a step further and decried “the tortuous shoehorning of various
activities into the constrictive trilogy by declaring the simple walk
of a scuba diver across the intertidal zone to the ocean as fitting into
the definition of ‘navigation.’”56 As long as the courts and
legislature are constrained by the three traditional activities of
fishing, fowling, and navigation, permissible activities that do not
fit easily into any of the three will be “creatively” defined. 57 This
muddying of definitions will continue to take place until the rights
of the public are clearly delineated. Contorted linguistic reasoning
will not make the public nor the private landowners any more
confident in their rights. Without a statewide system for managing
public shoreline access, confusion will continue to grow.
C.

The Confusing Precedent: The Moody Beach Cases

Much of the current confusion and debate about public rights
stems from the restriction of those rights in the Moody Beach cases.
A series of state court decisions from the 1980s, the Moody Beach
cases are the most definitive and controversial public trust doctrine
cases in the State of Maine.58 Concluded in 1989 with the Supreme
53

Id.
Id.
55
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620.
56
Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 39, 206_ A.3d 283__
(Saufley, C.J., concurring).
57
Id.
58
Thaxter, supra note 33, at 117. Although the Law Court has faced questions of
public shoreline access in the ensuing years, the Court has decided those cases
without relying on the public trust doctrine. See Almeder, 2019 ME 151, 217
54
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Judicial Court decision in Bell v .Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me.
1989), the Moody Beach cases have been the subject of nearconstant discussion and, from some sectors, vociferous criticism.59
The private landowners of twenty-eight shoreland lots in the Town
of Wells, Maine brought an action against the town to enjoin the
public’s recreational use of Moody Beach.60 Although the historic
record shows that the public had been using Moody Beach
recreationally since the nineteenth century, the landowners claimed
title in fee simple absolute over the upland and intertidal areas,
particularly expressing concern over the increase in public presence
on the Beach and the accompanying increase in disruptions to the
private landowners.61 The role of the court, then, was to decide if
this title was valid and then to determine whether, notwithstanding
the private landowner’s title, the public had a right to use the
intertidal land on Moody Beach recreationally under the public trust
doctrine.62 This case specifically focused on whether the public have
a right to use the intertidal zone recreationally, not just for fishing,
fowling, and navigation.63

A.3d 1111 (decided using title); Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 34, 206 A.3d 283 (decided
based on the definition of fishing).
59
See generally DELOGU, supra note 8 (presenting the controversial opinion that
the Moody Beach cases should be overturned by the Maine Law Court or, if not,
by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutional); Thaxter, supra note
33; Michael P. Dixon, Drawing Lines in the Disappearing Sand: A Reevaluation
of Shoreline Rights and Regimes a Quarter Century After Bell v. Town of Wells,
16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.481 (2011); Kenlan, supra note 2.
60
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 170 (Me. 1989) (majority opinion).
61
Bell, 557 A.2d at 170. Intertidal zone: “[L]and bounded by tide water
extend[ing] from high water mark over the shore or flats to low water mark, if
not beyond one hundred rods.” Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1894)
(defining the intertidal zone based on the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of
1641, from which Maine also derived its understanding of the intertidal zone).
This has also been referred to as “‘flats,’ ‘foreshore,’ and ‘beachfront’” (see
Bell, 557 A.2d at 169 n.3), but generally means the area of the shoreline
between the mean high-water mark and the mean low water mark. See also
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 16, 28 A.3d 620, 625 (defining
intertidal zone as the land between the average low tide line and the average
high tide line).
62
See Bell, 557 A.2d. at 169.
63
Id. at 187 (Wathen, J., dissenting) (“Significantly, however, we have not held,
nor even suggested, that the scheme of ownership established by the Ordinance
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In its controversial ruling, the court determined that the
private landowners held title in fee simple absolute under the
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance and that the public trust doctrine
did not grant the general public the right to use Moody Beach
recreationally.64 Part of that holding included rejecting the
contention that the public had the right to use the intertidal zone
through an easement established by custom of use, illustrating just
how seriously the rights of private landowners are taken in Maine
common law.65 The final disposition of the legal issues in these
cases is generally seen as having expanded the rights of littoral
landowners while narrowing the rights of the public under the public
trust doctrine.66
In the final Moody Beach decision, the Law Court made two
statements regarding the role of the legislature in addressing the
tensions over intertidal lands. The court first declared the Public
Trust in Intertidal Land Act of 198767 unconstitutional but then
suggested in the conclusion of the majority opinion that a
legislative solution would be the only way to successfully solve
the ongoing confusion about the public’s rights to use the
intertidal zone.68 This legislative solution has not yet been
effectively pursued. Following this suggestion from the Law
Court, however, the Legislature can enact laws and rules that
will better address public access concerns in Maine.
1.

The Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act Declared
Unconstitutional

The Legislature tried to enact a law protecting public access
rights with the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act of 1987. When
precludes the public from using the intertidal zone for common recreational
beach activities.”).
64
Id. at 179-80 (majority opinion).
65
Id. at 179.
66
Orlando E. Delogu, Friend of the Court: An Array of Arguments to Urge
Reconsideration of the Moody Beach Cases and Expand Public Use Rights in
Maine’s Intertidal Zone, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 47, 47 (2011).
67
The Public Trust in Intertidal Land. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 571-73
(2017) (declared unconstitutional by Bell, 557 A.2d).
68
Bell, 557 A.2d at 180.
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the court declared the Act unconstitutional, it added a further twist
in the tangled relationship between judicial and legislative attempts
to clarify the form and function of the public trust doctrine in
Maine.69 The Maine State Legislature quickly drafted and passed
the Intertidal Land Act while the Moody Beach cases were being
litigated, after the first decision and before the final Law Court
opinion.70 This legislative action is commonly seen as an attempt by
the legislature to block the judiciary from interfering with the
public’s rights under the public trust doctrine.71 The Intertidal Land
Act announced that protecting public use of intertidal lands was “of
great public interest and great concern to the State”72 and not only
codified the common law rights under the public trust doctrine
(fishing, fowling, and navigation) but included a right of the public
to use the intertidal zone for recreational purposes.73 Before the
Moody Beach case was appealed to the Law Court, the Superior
Court had declared this Act unconstitutional under the separation of
powers provisions of the Maine State Constitution.74
However, the Supreme Judicial Court declined to make a
separation of powers determination and instead attacked the
Intertidal Land Act as an unconstitutional taking, announcing that
the State, through the Act, essentially created an easement over the
intertidal land for the general public.75 Taking land without
compensation is barred by both the Maine and United States
Constitutions.76 The broad language in the Act authorizing the
general public to use intertidal land for “recreation” heavily
burdened the fee holders, according to the court.77 Without
69

Thaxter, supra note 33, at 132.
Id. at 131-32. The two main Moody Beach cases are commonly referred to as
Bell I (Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986)) and Bell II (Bell v.
Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989)).
71
Id. at 132.
72
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 571 (2017).
73
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 571 (2017)
74
Bell v. Town of Wells, No. CV-84-125, 1987 Me. Super. LEXIS 256, at *45
(Sept. 14, 1987) (referring to separation of powers as delineated in Maine
Constitution article III.).
75
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176-77 (Me. 1989).
76
U.S. CONST. amend. V; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
77
Bell, 557 A.2d at 177.
70
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compensating the landowners for that burden, the State had engaged
in an unconstitutional taking by enacting the Intertidal Land Act. 78
The Legislature had attempted to preempt what it saw happening in
the courts in the Moody Beach cases—the slow erosion of the
sanctified public trust doctrine. However, the Act failed to serve as
a barrier, and the court easily dispensed with the Act and the goals
of the Legislature in the final Moody Beach decision.79
2.

Suggested Legislative Solution

In striking down the Intertidal Land Act, the court did not
preclude all legislative action. Ultimately, the decisions in the
Moody Beach cases illustrated the tension between the sanctity of
private land ownership and the long tradition of the public trust
doctrine. With the facts of the cases as they stood, the Law Court
concluded that the arguments for the general public’s recreational
use of Moody Beach were unconvincing and that the Legislature had
failed to craft a constitutional law to that effect.80 However, the
discussion does not end there. While the Law Court found the
Intertidal Land Act unconstitutional and concurrently granted
private littoral landowners greater advantages over the public trust
doctrine their final Moody Beach decision did not close the door on
the issue.81 The Legislature, clearly, had failed to draft sufficiently
well crafted legislation to block the courts from further limiting the
general public’s shoreland access and use rights. The court,
however, left space for the Legislature to try again.82 The court
suggested that a solution perhaps should not come not from broad
legislative acts but instead from state and municipal land controls.83
Because the public trust doctrine has been developed through

78

Id.
Id. at 180.
80
.Bell, 557 A.2d.
81
Id. at 180.
82
“The solution under our constitutional system, however, is for the State or
municipalities to purchase the needed property rights or obtain them by eminent
domain through the payment of just compensation, not to take them without
compensation through legislative or judicial decree redefining the scope of
private property rights.” Id.
83
Id.
79

320

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:2

common law, history, and custom, how to engage in these locallevel interventions on behalf of the public is murky at best.84
Further, the in-court debate over the future of the public trust
doctrine as narrowed by Bell v. Town of Wells has continued, with
occasional suggestions to re-asses that decision appearing in court
opinions.85 The contrasts between the interests of landowners and
the interests of the public will continue to give courts and lawmakers
challenges as long as the debate over how to manage the public trust
doctrine remains unsettled. To prevent this, the State and local
governments should implement land control and land use programs
to clear up this confusion moving forward.
While conflicts over the public trust doctrine continue to
simmer in the courts and the Legislature, citizens of and visitors to
Maine rely heavily on coastal access—continuing confusion about
the best approach to the public trust doctrine promises more conflict
until a final resolution is reached. Any final plan for a successful,
constitutionally valid approach to the public trust doctrine must be
rooted in Maine’s strong connection to the ocean and coastal areas.
Maine has approximately 3,500 miles of coastline, including the
islands, but only around 40 miles of that is set aside in public
beaches.86 While fishing, fowling, and navigation rights are most
protected by the public trust doctrine, recreation is a valuable part of
coastal use and access.87 Particularly as Maine becomes more
popular as a tourist destination and as visitors increasingly decide to
move to the State permanently or purchase property, the confusion
and legal mazes built up around public coastal access must be
addressed to avoid further muddying of the waters.88 In her

84

Id. at 182-88 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
“I concur in the result and in the reasoning of the Court. I write separately,
however, because I would overrule Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me.
1989).” Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 49, 760 A.2d 232, 248
(Saufley, J., concurring).
86
MARINE LAW INST., UNIV. OF ME. SCH. OF LAW, PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS
IN MAINE: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 2004, 2.
87
Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 51, 760 A.2d 232, 249 (Saufley, J., concurring).
88
“Thus, we should acknowledge the problems created by our holding in Bell
before landowners and the public are forced through years of uncertainty and
85
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concurrence in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., Chief Justice
Saufley pointed out the irony that “[s]ince [the Moody Beach
decision], a member of the public has been allowed to stroll along
the wet sands of Maine’s intertidal zone holding a gun or a fishing
rod, but not holding the hand of a child.”89
Clearly, a statewide plan for public shoreline access must
take recreational interests into consideration. Maine relies heavily
on tourism for economic stability and the number of visitors to
Maine increases every year.90 These tourists visit Maine for
numerous reasons and the coast is certainly one of them. If coastal
access decreases, Maine’s tourism industry will suffer. Tourists are
not the only ones with interests in accessing the coast, however.
Maine residents also want access to the coast for recreational
purposes and have been doing so for generations in some places.91
Therefore, although it is not a part of the traditional activities
protected by the public trust doctrine, Maine should include
recreational considerations in its planning for better implementation
and management of the public trust doctrine.
However, a solution must consider the constitutional hurdles
that already stymied the Legislature as well as the
interconnectedness of Maine’s common law with the Massachusetts
Colonial Ordinance.92 The Intertidal Land Act of 1987 attempted to
find a solution that would not run afoul of the Colonial Ordinance
but in doing so missed the constitutional implications.93 A wellunworkable restrictions founded upon a faulty legal analysis.” Id. ¶ 53(Saufley,
J., concurring).
89
Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 34, 206 A.3d 283 (majority opinion).
90
The State saw more than $6 billion in tourism spending in 2017 and a 2.5%
increase in visitors. 2017 Maine Office of Tourism Highlights, MAINE OFFICE OF
TOURISM (2018), https://motpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2017Maine-Tourism-Highlights.pdf, [https://perma.cc/SGW5-FGBM].
91
Although the Court found the evidence of the exact nature and extent of
public recreational use of Moody Beach to be inconclusive, testimony clearly
showed that the public had been accessing the beach for various recreational
purposes since the 17th century. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 170
(Me. 1989) (majority opinion).
92
Id. at 170-72.
93
Id. at 192 (Wathen, J., dissenting) (worrying that the Law Court dispensed
with the Intertidal Lands Act of 1987 too casually and failed to suggest a proper
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designed, land-use focused solution will not fall short on either of
those fronts. As the State and the law move further from the Moody
Beach Cases temporally and metaphysically, legal challenges to
both public use and private restrictions on that use have led to
plurality decisions and greater splintering of the understanding of
the public trust doctrine in Maine.94 Following the recent decisions
in Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport and Ross v. Acadian
Seaplants, Ltd.,95 the need for a solution is more apparent than ever.
The hair’s-breadth distinction in that case between private property
and property held in trust by the State, analyzed under two distinct
doctrinal approaches to the issue, illustrates the unworkability of the
current jurisprudence and legal understanding of “the delineation
between public and private rights in and to the intertidal area.”96 In
the interests of judicial economy, landowner peace of mind, and
public confidence in their rights, Maine must clarify exactly what
rights belong to the public and what rights are reserved for the
private landowners.
IV. MAINE SHOULD IMPROVE ITS IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE BY CLEARLY
DEFINING ITS LEGAL STANDING AND ESTABLISHING
SPECIFIC METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING IT
way forward to address what the dissent characterized as “public rights [. . .]
quickly and completely extinguished.”).
94
“[The Moody Beach decision] has generated significant and expensive
litigation resulting from the Court’s limitation of the public’s allowable
activities to those that can be forced into the definitions of ‘fishing, fowling, and
navigation.’ . . . The constrictive trilogy of that holding has bedeviled the State
of Maine since that opinion was issued.” Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019
ME 45, ¶ 37, 206 A.3d 283 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). See, e.g., McGarvey v.
Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620 (resulting in a plurality decision in which
the Law Court agreed that scuba diving fell under the public trust doctrine’s
“navigation” provision but refused to rule on the lower court’s characterization
of the final Moody Beach case as no-longer useful authority).
95
Almeder, 2019 ME 151, 217 A.3d 1111 (holding that the Town has title to the
contested beach therefore mooting the issue of property owner’s rights to
exclude); Ross, 2019 ME 45, 206 A.3d 283 (majority opinion) (holding that
rockweed, a species of seaweed that grows in the intertidal zone, belongs to the
upland owners and is not part of the shoreland property “subject to certain
public rights”) (internal citation omitted).
96
Id. at ¶ 13.
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Most of the discussion around improving the understanding
and application of the public trust doctrine in Maine focuses on
overruling the Moody Beach cases.97 Unless the Law Court makes
dramatic changes in their approach to stare decisis, however, the
Moody Beach cases will not be overturned.98 This focus on
overruling those cases misses what the Law Court itself suggests, a
solution combining legislative and local municipal powers.99
A. Where the Public Trust Doctrine Stands in Maine’s
System

Legal

Fortunately, for public shoreline access advocates, there is
no question that the public trust doctrine is established in Maine’s
legal framework. In its many cases concerning coastal access, the
Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged unequivocally that the
public trust doctrine exists and applies in Maine.100 Although the
Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act was declared unconstitutional in
97

See, e.g., DELOGU, supra note 8.
Thaxter, supra note 33, at 139-40 (expressing concern over Justice Saufley’s
concurrence in Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, 760 A.2d 233, which
suggested that the Law Court had held too tightly to stare decisis in their
decision in that case). See also Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 40, 206 A.3d 283 (Saufley,
C.J., concurring) (warning that stare decisis may cause the Moody Beach
decision to become essentially unchangeable without quicker action to counter
act it).
99
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 180 (Me. 1989) (majority opinion).
100
“There can be no question that, pursuant to the original public trust doctrine,
the public has the right to use the ocean itself, subject to certain governmental
regulation.” McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 12, 28 A.3d 620, 625.
The Moody Beach decision did not abolish this right. “The Moody Beach ruling
noted that the public still had the right, by virtue of the public easement
originating in the Colonial Ordinance, to use privately-owned intertidal land, but
only if engaged in fishing, fowling, or navigation. The land to which this
easement applies is the area between mean high water and mean low water (or to
1,650 feet seaward from the high water, if the mean low watermark is even
farther seaward). If the shoreline is beach, this is the wet sand area. If the
shoreline is marsh, mudflat, or ledge, the intertidal area will commonly consist
of gravel beaches or mud flats. However, the decision in the Moody Beach case
was close (a 4-3 ruling regarding the issue of public rights in the intertidal area),
tempting those who argue that the public’s rights ought to be interpreted more
broadly.” Duff, supra note 40, at 6
98
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the final Moody Beach Case, the Legislature clearly showed its
intent to honor and enshrine the public trust doctrine. When
declaring this law unconstitutional, however, the court said that the
method of implementation was wrong, not the intent of the
legislation, endorsing the goal of the Legislature.101
To move forward with protecting the public trust doctrine and
its implementation, there are three issues Maine must address before
progress can be made. The first issue to address is identifying the
exact constitutional backing for the public trust doctrine in the State.
As of yet, there is no consensus from the courts and the Legislature
regarding the constitutional nature of the doctrine. Before any other
steps can be taken, there must be a firm statement that the public
trust doctrine does not violate the State’s Constitution and is in fact
impliedly established in the State Constitution.
The second issue is reconciliation between the public trust
doctrine and the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance. As discussed
above, this Colonial Ordinance creates particular difficulty for the
public trust doctrine by granting fee simple to the low water mark
for the littoral landowners. Just as it has repeatedly affirmed the
existence of the public trust doctrine, the Law Court has also
repeatedly adhered to the Colonial Ordinance, making it just as
anchored in Maine’s coastal land law. The relationship between the
two must be defined.
The third and final issue to address in resolving the
confusion around the public trust doctrine is the method for
regulation and implementation. Because Maine already has a strong
history of allowing municipalities active control over shoreline
access in their jurisdictions for many purposes, these systems of
municipal control are the appropriate vehicle for moving ahead with
an improved approach to the public trust doctrine.

101

See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
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Finding a Constitutional Consensus in the Language of the
Maine State Constitution and in the Common Law

Before any further work can be done establishing a workable
application of the public trust doctrine in Maine, it must be
determined that the doctrine is included in some way in Maine’s
Constitution.102 This is necessary because the courts rely heavily on
the State Constitution when analyzing legislative action that touches
on public and private land access and use.103 Future legislation on
the public trust doctrine will continue to meet challenges from
various angles, but a clear statement that the doctrine itself is
implied under the Maine Constitution will protect at least the
foundational premise of that legislation. When the court actively
declined making such a clear statement, it indicated that the
Legislative Powers Clause104 would be the likely section of the
constitution to base such a statement on.105 That Clause states, “The
Legislature, with the exceptions hereinafter stated, shall have full
power to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations for
the defense and benefit of the people of this State, not repugnant to
this Constitution, nor to that of the United States.”106 Based on the
language of this Clause and the nature of the public trust doctrine,
there can be a categorical determination that the public trust doctrine
is protected by Maine’s constitution.

102

The Supreme Judicial Court has cited this lack of clarity in the constitutional
status of the doctrine when analyzing challenges to statutes limiting public
access. Harding v. Comm’r of Marine Res., 510 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Me. 1986).
103
See, e.g., Bell, 557 A.2d (finding the Intertidal Land Act unconstitutional
under a takings analysis); Harding, 510 A.2d (refusing to determine whether the
public trust doctrine is implied in Maine’s Constitution but stating that state
action limiting public and private land use and access must pass constitutional
muster); Me. State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors Tr. Co., 278 A.2d 699 (Me. 1971)
(stating that the legislature has the power to enact laws for the benefit of the
people of Maine so long as those laws are not “repugnant” to the Maine and
United States Constitutions); Op. of Justices, 231 A.2d 431 (Me. 1967) (opining
that proposed legislation did not violate the powers of the legislature to enact
laws affecting land use and access).
104
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1.
105
Harding, 510 A.2d at 537.
106
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1.
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In order to make this determination, the basics of the
doctrine must be compared with the language of the state
constitution and the application of that language in the common law.
First, the basic principle of the public trust doctrine is that the state
holds the lands encompassed by the doctrine in trust for the
people.107 Generally, this means that the state holds those lands for
the benefit of the people. Second, the language of the state
constitution limits the legislative powers to actions “for the defense
and benefit of the people.”108 Clearly, the language of the state
constitution and the principles of the public trust doctrine parallel
each other in their interest in the benefit of the people. Third, the
court has used the language of the Legislative Powers Clause to
determine that “a statute that violated the State’s legal
responsibilities as trustee for the public would not be reasonable for
the public benefit and would therefore exceed the Legislature’s
constitutional powers.”109 According to the court’s interpretation of
this clause, any enactment from the Legislature must be three things:
1) reasonable; 2) for the benefit of the people; and 3) not “repugnant
to any other provision of the Maine or United States Constitution.”110
While there has been some debate in the courts over the role
of the judiciary in “determining whether any particular release by
the Legislature of the people’s rights in submerged or intertidal
lands conforms with the constitutional limitations laid down by the
Legislative Powers Clause,”111 the specific role of the courts is less
relevant than the language itself. With the historic application of the
public trust doctrine “for the benefit of the people” and the exact
same language in the Maine Constitution, it is clear that the doctrine
is encompassed by the state constitution. There are no foreseeable
problems with this reading, although the courts might face
challenges reconciling it with jurisprudence from cases like Bell.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1846 (2018) (codifying the State’s holding of
public reserved lands in trust for the public).
108
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1.
109
Op. of Justices, 437 A2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981).
110
Id.
111
Id. (criticizing suggestions in Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343, 360 (1850) that
the Law Court does not have responsibility for determining the constitutionality
of legislative acts under the Legislative Powers Clause).
107
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Regardless, any future questions about the doctrine can start from
an assumption that the doctrine is enshrined in the state constitution.
2.

Reconciling the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of
1641-1647 with the Public Trust Doctrine

Even with a clear determination that the public trust doctrine
is part of Maine’s Constitution, it must be reconciled with another,
older foundational basis for Maine’s handling of coastal land—the
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance.
As discussed above, the
Colonial Ordinance created a possessory property interest for littoral
landowners at odds with the long history of public ownership of the
intertidal zone. There is no question that the land granted to the
private landowners under the Ordinance was historically the
possession of the state in trust for the public.112 This does not mean,
however, that the Colonial Ordinance is irreconcilable with the
public trust doctrine. In fact, despite its inherent restriction on
public rights through grant of title to landowners, the Ordinance
expanded certain rights, adding “fowling” to uses guaranteed to the
public.113 The Ordinance, therefore, does not need to be viewed as
a staunch enemy of the public’s rights. In certain cases, courts have
made statements seeming to indicate that any land privately held
under the authorization of the Colonial Ordinance is not subject to
any public access rights under the public trust doctrine. 114 What
“The shores of the sea and navigable rivers, within the flux and reflux of the
tide, belong prima facie to the king, and may belong to a subject. ‘The jus
privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with, and subject to that jus
publicum which belongs to the king's subjects.’ Hale, De Jure Maris, c. 6; De
Portibus Maris, c. 7. Whatever right the king had by his royal prerogative in the
shores of the sea and of navigable rivers, he held as a jus publicum in trust for
the benefit of the people for the purposes of navigation and of fishery. These
positions have been approved in judicial decisions too numerous to be
mentioned. They are not known to have been denied by any respectable
authority. . . . ‘The jus privatum that is acquired to the subject, either by patent
or prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum wherewith public rivers and
arms of the sea are affected.’ Hale, De Jure Maris.” Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me.
472, 485-86 (1854). See also Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 448 (1882).
113
Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 10, 206 A.3d 283.
114
See, e.g., Sawyer v. Beal, 97 Me. 356, 357-58 (1903) (“In this State under the
Colonial Ordinance of 1641, as modified by that of 1647, which has become the
common law of this state, the owner of land upon the sea shore owns to low
112
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these cases show, however, is that the Colonial Ordinance is
established law, not that it supersedes the public trust doctrine. Just
as the courts have repeatedly stated that the Colonial Ordinance is
the law, they have also repeatedly stated that the public trust doctrine
is the law.115
In order to reconcile the private ownership with the public
trust doctrine, a review of the language of these cases affirming both
policies clarifies the relationship between the two. In State v.
Wilson, 42 Me. 9 (1856), the court stated that the private owners did
own the intertidal zone but this ownership did not give them the
power to interfere with the public’s rights of fishing, fowling, and
navigation.116 Courts have further stated that the public retains the
rights under the public trust doctrine and only the Legislature has
the power to curb those rights, not private landowners.117 The
Colonial Ordinance itself specifies that the private landowner may
not interfere with the right of the public to fish and fowl.118 In the
final Moody Beach case, however, the Law Court listed the public’s
rights as fishing, fowling, and navigation.119 Although the Law
Court devoted a great deal of energy in the Moody Beach cases to
cementing the Colonial Ordinance in Maine’s common law, it did
concede that, although the landowner holds title to the intertidal
zone, that title is subject to the rights of the public.120
While the public trust doctrine and the Colonial Ordinance
clearly coexist at common law, it is not clear exactly what form the
water mark, unless the tide recedes more than one hundred rods, although of
course the ownership of upland and flats may become divided by the act of the
owner. Within the limits of his ownership he has all the exclusive rights of an
owner.”).
115
See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶
36, 823 A.2d 551, 563; Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672
A.2d 91, 95 (Me. 1996); Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 56 (1906).
116
State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 28 (1856).
117
Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 449-50 (1882).
118
THOMAS G. BARNES, THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES
CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS at 35 (1975).
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Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989).
120
“The plaintiffs' title is subject to the public right of use declared by the
Colonial Ordinance.” Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 516 (Me. 1986).
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public trust is held in under that regime. Generally, the public trust
doctrine requires that the state hold the intertidal land in trust for the
benefit of the public but the Colonial Ordinance takes that
ownership from the State and grants it to the private landowners.
This distinction is ultimately one of form rather than function. The
Colonial Ordinance does grant title to those landowners but it
specifically does not take away the rights of the public. The rights
specified in the Ordinance do not include navigation,121 but no court
has stated that this third right of the public trust doctrine is not
available in Maine. When approached from within the intricacies of
centuries of common law and contorted legal analysis, the
Ordinance and the doctrine appear starkly at odds. However, the
courts, with the possible exception of the final Moody Beach case,122
have simply stated over and over again that the private ownership
may not interfere with the public’s rights.
3.

Ensuring Public Access to the Intertidal Zone with Land Use
Controls

Having established that the public has retained its rights to
use of the intertidal zone despite the Massachusetts Colonial
Ordinance’s grant of title to the private landowners, the legal avenue
for preserving those rights must be determined. The legislative
solution attempted during the Moody Beach cases failed, not
because of the rights it sought to preserve, but because of the manner
in which it preserved them.123 Other laws exist in Maine that seem
to create avenues for public shoreline access but they have been rife
with legal conflict. For example, Maine’s prescriptive easement law
has been addressed as related to public shoreline access numerous
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BARNES, supra note 122, at 35.
Despite the language of the court affirming the public rights preserved under
the Colonial Ordinance, the holding in that case indicates that the public may
only use the intertidal land with permission of the landowners. Likely due to the
confusion around the public trust doctrine in Maine, the court attempted to use
easements as a way to distinguish the public rights from the private, resulting,
unfortunately, in a determination that the public must have permission of
landowners. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
123
Id. at 176-77.
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times in the courts, but the results are inconsistent.124 Recently, the
Law Court determined that there is a “presumption of permission”
when the public uses the shoreland areas and this presumption
prevents a prescriptive easement from being established by
eliminating the required adverse nature of the use.125 Beyond
prescriptive easements, no other statutory provision has had
significant bearing on public shoreline access litigation.
Fortunately, a legislative solution can be created that will
honor the interests of both the general public and the private
landowners. What the Legislature cannot do, however, is repeat the
same errors of the Intertidal Land Act and create laws that amount
to an unconstitutional taking of private land. Obviously, any takings
challenge could be avoided if the landowners were adequately
financially compensated, but equitable financial compensation is an
unattractive option, as the landowners would resent the
governmental action and the costs would likely be extreme. A better
legislative solution should instead make use of the significant
powers granted to municipalities under Maine’s Constitution.126
This constitutional provision designates Home Rule127 power to
municipalities in Maine, meaning these municipalities are a vehicle
for protecting public access rights under local authority. The
legislative solution, therefore, is a statute directly authorizing local
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See, e.g., Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, 760 A.2d 232 (majority
opinion) (holding that the town and therefore the public had acquired a
prescriptive easement over the beach); Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 106
A.3d 1115 (Me. 2014) (questioning the possibility of acquiring prescriptive
easements in the shoreland context); Cedar Beach/Cedar Island Supporters, Inc.
v. Gables Real Estate LLC, 2016 ME 114, 145 A.3d 1024 (ruling that the public
did not have a prescriptive easement to a road leading to the beach).
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Almeder, 106 A.3d 1115. 14 M.R.S.A. § 812 (2018).
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ME. CONST. art. VIII, part 2, § 1 (“The inhabitants of any municipality shall
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local government . . . .” Home rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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municipalities to enact ordinances to address and manage the
public’s rights.128
Setting up programs in municipalities to closely manage and
organize public shoreline access is not a novel idea in Maine. Towns
already exercise a certain amount of control over fishing activities,
including implementation of ordinances and systems for managing
shellfish harvesting and designating conservation spaces.129 Under
municipal management programs, towns allow and regulate various
manners of fishing access. People wanting to fish on Maine’s coast
via privately owned land may access public paths for clamming,
mooring places for boats on private shoreline, and even wharves for
larger operations.130 These systems set up for fishing access are
generally successful in ensuring public access while keeping private
landowners satisfied131 and can be used as models for creating new
programs for other forms of public access or for improving plans
already in place. In order to design effective and durable programs
for increasing and preserving public access to the coast, elements
such as the stability of the public trust doctrine in Maine’s legal
cannon and the relationship between the State Legislature and the
municipal governments must be taken into account. With this solid
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Another possible option is a statute similar to the Intertidal Development
Regulations in Massachusetts (310 MASS. CODE REGS. §9.53 (2017)), which
require that development in intertidal areas “not significantly interfere” with
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legal and legislative foundation, an improved program for public
shoreline access will be less vulnerable to legal challenges.
Because of the coastal character of much of the State of
Maine, models and systems already exist where municipalities
exercise authority over their coastlines under statutory authority. 132
Rather than write totally new legislation, the Legislature may amend
the already existing shoreland zoning statute to include specific
authorization for municipalities to engage in certain programs to
ensure public access rights. There are two main ways in which
municipalities can accomplish this: zoning ordinances and contracts.
Zoning ordinances restrict how a landowner uses their property, for
example by limiting development that would reduce shoreline
access. Contracts are agreements between municipalities and
landowners or developers that establish certain terms that the parties
will both abide by. Each of these options has benefits and
drawbacks and they will be addressed in turn.
a.

Zoning as a Tool for Ensuring Public Access

By statutory mandate, all towns in Maine with shoreline
within their boundaries must have a shoreland-zoning plan.133
Because of Maine’s constitutional provision of Home Rule,
municipalities have a great deal of flexibility in creating these plans.
Maine also has specific statutory mandate that coastal plans must
“[s]upport shoreline management that . . . promotes public access to
the shoreline and that considers the cumulative effects of
development on coastal resources.”134 A zoning ordinance could
require, for example, that a developer set aside a certain amount of
land as a public access point, such as a roadway or footpath.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 435 (2018) (“To aid in the fulfillment of the
State's role as trustee of its waters and to promote public health, safety and the general
welfare, it is declared to be in the public interest that shoreland areas be subject to zoning
and land use controls. . . . The purposes of these controls are . . . to conserve shore cover,
and visual as well as actual points of access to inland and coastal waters . . . . [I]t is the
intention of the Legislature to recognize that it is reasonable for municipalities to treat
shoreland areas specially and immediately to zone around water bodies rather than to
wait until such time as zoning ordinances may be enacted for all of the land within
municipal boundaries.”).
133
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134
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This kind of zoning ordinance, however, still potentially
creates an unconstitutional taking by depriving the landowner of
exclusive use of that portion of their land. Therefore, these
ordinances must include incentives to landowners and developers to
ensure the taking is compensated. Some possible incentives for
developers and landowners include tax incentives (such as reduced
tax rates in exchange for providing public access points or a tax
credit where land dedicated for public access is treated as a
charitable donation), modified density and setback requirements
(allowing developers to construct more units than typically allowed
so that they receive more economic benefit from the land not set
aside for public access), and reduced licensing and permitting fees
for developers. Finally, the private landowners would significantly
benefit from these ordinances, as the public access points would be
limited to specific areas and they would not face challenges from the
public for preventing access.
b.

Establishing Contracts Between Municipalities and Private
Landowners

Another option, utilized substantially in the Town of
Kennebunkport, is the creation of contracts between municipalities
and landowners to ensure public access to the shore.135 These
contracts do not convey any property rights and should be for use
rights only. They must meet all of the legal requirements for a valid
contract, meaning the municipality must give the landowners
something of value in return for a pledge to allow public access. In
Kennebunkport, for example, the landowners agreed to allow public
access to Goose Rocks Beach and in return, the Town maintains
parking spaces and enforces limits on activities such as camping,
fires, and loitering.136 The contract, enacted as a town ordinance in
2013, also establishes certain areas of the Beach that are off limits
to the general public and indemnifies private landowners for any
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Duff, supra note 40 at 10.
Beach Use Ordinance for Kennebunkport, Maine, section IV(C) (2013).
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claims brought against them by the public.137 In circumstances
where a zoning ordinance is not practical or would be ineffective
(such as in areas where there is no active development or where
funds for compensation would be unavailable), such contracts for
shoreline access and use can sufficiently address public and private
interests. Further, when a contract is enacted in an ordinance, it will
remain in effect in perpetuity unless the voters choose to amend or
repeal it.
c.

Other Options Exist which are less likely to be Effective and
Useful than Zoning and Contracts

Occasionally, other tools can be used in local settings to
ensure public shoreline access. These tools are less likely to be
effective than those discussed above and should only be considered
where there are no other options.138 Private landowners may choose
to grant access by means of a gift, an easement, a right-of-way, a
lease, or a license.139 These private agreements are slightly
troublesome, however, as they can create situations where the wellheeled public might pay landowners for exclusive access or where
only certain special interest groups are allowed to cross the private
land.140 Although such private agreements make some progress
towards addressing public access concerns, they should be
considered last resort options where zoning and contracts are
available.
V. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine is here to stay. Despite the
complexity of reconciling the doctrine with the Colonial Ordinance
137

Beach Use Ordinance for Kennebunkport, Maine, section VII(J) (2013). Such
release from liability is also covered under the Maine Tort Claims Act, ME. REV.
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of 1641-1647, the State of Maine can honor both of these
foundational common law policies. In fact, Maine must adopt ways
to work with both of these competing ideas of shoreline ownership
and access in order to ensure continued growth and development of
the State as a whole. Maine’s economy relies heavily on the
coastline and as access shrinks, so do the benefits reaped from this
feature. Without creating systems through which the interests of
private landowners and the public are effectively managed, Maine
will continue to see confusion and conflict in this area of the law. A
solution is readily available in the form of municipal action
authorized by the Legislature. By placing the power of managing
public access in the hands of municipalities, Maine can establish
better public shoreline access while avoiding running afoul of the
rights and interests of private littoral landowners.
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